including:

abdominal pain, anorexia or/and weight loss, attention difficulties, burning or/and flushing, chest discomfort, chills, diarrhea, dizziness, dry mouth, dyspepsia, fatigue, heaviness, injection side reaction, insomnia, language difficulties, memory difficulties, nasal signs and symptoms, nausea, numbness, paresthesia or/and tingling, pharyngitis, somnolence or/and drowsiness, stinging or/and pressure sensation, taste disturbance, tinnitus, upper respiratory tract infection, vomiting, weakness

Most interestingly, the side effects of a sugar pill depend on what illness it is “treating.”  And they resemble the side effects of the active medicine the placebo is standing in for.  Mindhacks offers the most likely explanation.

One explanation may be that before taking part in a clinical trial, patients are informed of the possible side-effects that the active drug may cause, regardless of whether they are going to be given placebo or the actual medication.

Another is that getting better by itself has side effects.  The theory would be that the body adjusts to the illness in certain ways and recovery is followed by undoing those adjustments, the physiological effects of which appear to be side-effects of the medicine.

Iceland is seeing a small baby boom.

The Icelandic press buzzed with the good news. One article quoted a midwife in the town of Húsavik who noted a bump in births in June and July — an auspicious nine months after the worst of Iceland’s meltdown. Wrote blogger Alda Sigmundsdóttir: “I think many, many of us must have sought solace in love and sex and all that good stuff.”

Italians too, and condom sales were brisk at the low point of the recession in the US.  But historical pattern has been procyclical procreation*

“total fertility” — roughly, the average number of children per woman during her childbearing years — was 2.53 in 1929 and had slid to 2.15 by 1936. Then came the baby boom of postwar prosperity: The birth rate crossed 3 in 1947 and remained above that threshold until the mid-1960s. The next trough, 1.74, came in 1976 — a year earlier, unemployment had hit a postwar peak of 8.5%.

The article is in the Wall Street Journal.

__________

*The pun involving “hump” is an exercise left to the reader.

Is Friday’s IOC vote his last stand?

Gave a lunchtime talk at MIT today and was exhausted by 4 pm or so by rush of adrenalin leaving the bloodstream.  Had to re-energize.  What could be better than the take-out counterpart to the Oleana empire, Sofra Bakery?  Yummy flatbreads, meaty (wife had lamb) and veggy (I had spinach and three cheese).  Lots of mezzes, including feta with hot peppers, beet tzatziki, bean and walnut pate.  Great cheese borek which, unfortunately, by annoying kids were too picky to eat.   Wish it was on my way to work as they also have great breakfast.  If only Cambridge schools were less random, so we could have settled here.  But, looking on the bright side, we have Clear Flour Bread in Brookline.  And that’s a HUGE positive.

Should punishment depreciate as time passes?  As usual the answer probably depends on whether you think of punishment as justice or as a mechanism to internalize externalities.

I can see how the demands of justice could be reduced and even expire after many years pass.  One view is that identity evolves and eventually the accused is a different person from the criminal of the past and justice is not served by punishing someone who is effectively a third party.

On the other hand, if the purpose is to deter crime then the passage of time should arguably increase the punishment.  What matters is the perceived cost of the act evaluated at the time of acting.  A fixed penalty (possibly) deferred far in the future imposes a smaller cost.  To compensate for the discounting, the size of the penalty must be larger when it begins later.  Its tempting to say that because the time for acting has already passed there is no retroactive incentive effect from extending the punishment.  But this logic would undermine all penalties after the fact.  Indeed, the incentive theory of punishment relies on prosecutors holding to their commitments presumably because of reputational concerns.

Working against this is the incentive effect on prosecutors.  One reading of a statute of limitations is that it compels prosecutors to make reasonably prompt decisions to bring charges.  We can model this by supposing there is a flow cost of maintaining a defense:  keeping track of the whereabouts of witnesses, preserving documents, coordinating the memories of all involved.  The freedom to delay induces prosecutors to optimally impose costs on the innocent in order to maximize chances of conviction.

Presumably the latter is less of a concern when the criminal has already confessed.

When cellphone use is allowed on planes (e.g. on foreign airlines), people get on the phone.  But passengers seem to want airlines to ban use.  How are these things consistent?  Some simple theories:

1. Negative externality 1: You can’t control who calls you, e.g. your boss giving you yet more work.  If cellphone use is not allowed, no-one can call you.

2. Behavioral Economics story: You have a self-control problem.  You know you’ll use the phone excessively as you’re a phone addict.  Banning use helps you commit not to use it.

3. Prisoner’s Dilemma (Negative Externality 2): You want to use your phone on a flight but you don’t want your neighbour to use it.  But this is not possible so you know everyone will use their phone.  Then, you prefer that no-one be allowed to use a cellphone on flight, even if it prevents you from using your phone.  A possible solution: Some of the revenue generated can be returned to the passengers to compensate them for the externality they suffer.  Only way this will happen is if it gives one airline a competitive advantage over another.

Of course, with airlines in financial trouble, selling snacks on planes, Wi-Fi is coming somewhere to a plane near you whether you like it or not as someone will pay for it as they like it.

Mindhacks discusses a surprising asymmetry.  Journalists discussing sampling error almost always emphasize the possibility that the variable in question has been under-estimated.

For any individual study you can validly say that you think the estimate is too low, or indeed, too high, and give reasons for that… But when we look at reporting as a whole, it almost always says the condition is likely to be much more common than the estimate.

For example, have a look at the results of this Google search:

“the true number may be higher” 20,300 hits

“the true number may be lower” 3 hits

There are two parts to this.  First, the reporter is trying to sell her story.  So she is going to emphasize the direction of error that makes for the most interesting story. But that by itself doesn’t explain the asymmetry.

Let’s say we are talking about stories that report “condition X occurs Y% of the time.”  There is always an equivalent way to say the same thing: “condition Z occurs (100-Y)% of the time” (Z is the negation of X.)   If the selling point of the story is that X is more common than you might have thought, then the author could just as well say “The true frequency of Z may be lower” than the estimate.

So the big puzzle is why stories are always framed in one of two completely equivalent ways.  I assume that a large part of this is

  1. News is usually about rare things/events.
  2. If you are writing about X and X is rare, then you make the story more interesting by pointing out that X might be less rare than the reader thought.
  3. It is more natural to frame a story about the rareness of X by saying “X is rare, but less rare than you think” rather than “the lack of X is common, but less common than you think.”

But the more I think about symmetry the less convinced I am by this argument.  Anyway I am still amazed at the numbers from the google searches.

The list of Summers’ gaffes is long.  A key early entry occurred when he was the Chief Economist at the World Bank.  In a memo, it was suggested:

The measurements of the costs of health impairing pollution depends on the foregone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From this point of view a given amount of health impairing pollution should be done in the country with the lowest cost, which will be the country with the lowest wages. I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that.

(It turns out that the memo was written by an underling and Summers just signed it.)

This policy prescription is being followed illegally in Europe.  Recycling laws impose high costs of disposable in Europe and it is cheaper to export the waste to China, India and elsewhere.   The old memo made a point based on efficiency.   If transactions costs are low, the efficient solution is also the solution to decentralized voluntary trade (the Coase Theorem).  Ships arriving in Europe or the U.S. with goods from China have to go somewhere afterwards anyway.  Why not send them back full of waste?  Transactions costs are low and the solution the World Bank identified gives firms the incentive to transfer the waste, sometimes illegally.  Sometimes the dismal science’s dismal predictions turn out to be right.  Now, we have to think of whether we can design a better solution.  I’m going to look at Jeff’s intermediate micro notes to see if  I can come up with something.  Don’t hold your breath.

Kennebunkport ME

In Chicago, I love Semiramis and Nazareth Sweets.  The falafel special sandwich and the baklava form the basis of an initially healthy but finally indulgent meal.  While delicious, the options are generic.  Our main food discoveries in Boston have been Middle Eastern (broadly defined!).  The Armenian takeout we had a friend’s house had the usual hummus and babaganoush.  The dish that was spectacular and totally new to me was a pomegranate, chili and walnut mush  (I think it is called mouhamara).

And then last night, we went to Oleana.  What a revelation.  Greek, Turkish, Lebanese…etc. etc.  All represented and modified till the cuisine achieved a different level.  Everything was good.  The whipped feta with peppers, zucchini pancakes (I could have done with less haloumi) and finally the fideos – I’d never had them in a restaurant, have tried to cook them (the Zuni cookbook has a recipe I tried) and never knew how they should be.  Now I know.  Not sure if I will reach Oleana’s heights on this dish but at least I know what to aim at.  My wife enjoyed her lamb and eggplant dumplings and sausage.  We didn’t have room for desert.  Can’t wait to go back.

Typically I would guess Wall Street, consulting or a start-up in Silicon Valley.  That’s kind of how Ayr Nuir started off too.  Now, he has a new start-up, one that will likely improve my life for the better every day I am at MIT  – the Clover food truck.  I had the chickpea fritter and the fries.  They were excellent.  My companion, Jim Snyder, who in fact gave me this valuable local information, was very happy with his egg and eggplant sandwich.

Nuir is putting his degrees to good use.  They appear to be estimating demand every day.  There’s some iPhone based ordering and tracking technology that updates sales figures every day.  And they have a great marketing/information dissemination system via their website.   So, they make it into the media.  Hopefully, a Kellogg student will do something similar by the time I have to return.

“Tell the guys on Death Row that I’m not wearing a diaper.”

The most important development in the way we interact on the web will come when a system of micropayments is in place.  The big difficulties are coordination problems and security.  The strongest incentive to build and control a massive social network is that it will enable Facebook to host a micropayments economy within its closed environment, solving both the coordination problem and a big part of the security problem.

Here’s the future of Facebook.  You will subscribe to your friends.  A subscription costs you a flow of micropayments.  Your friends will include the likes of Tyler Cowen, The Wall Street Journal, gmail, Jay-Z, Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows, etc.

Remember that the next time you hear somebody say that there is no way to monetize Facebook or Twitter.

Wired reports that the Soviet Union actually had a doomsday device and kept it a secret.

“The whole point of the doomsday machine is lost if you keep it a secret!” cries Dr. Strangelove. “Why didn’t you tell the world?” After all, such a device works as a deterrent only if the enemy is aware of its existence. In the movie, the Soviet ambassador can only lamely respond, “It was to be announced at the party congress on Monday.”

So why was the US not informed about Perimeter? Kremlinologists have long noted the Soviet military’s extreme penchant for secrecy, but surely that couldn’t fully explain what appears to be a self-defeating strategic error of extraordinary magnitude.

The silence can be attributed partly to fears that the US would figure out how to disable the system. But the principal reason is more complicated and surprising. According to both Yarynich and Zheleznyakov, Perimeter was never meant as a traditional doomsday machine. The Soviets had taken game theory one step further than Kubrick, Szilard, and everyone else: They built a system to deter themselves.

By guaranteeing that Moscow could hit back, Perimeter was actually designed to keep an overeager Soviet military or civilian leader from launching prematurely during a crisis. The point, Zheleznyakov says, was “to cool down all these hotheads and extremists. No matter what was going to happen, there still would be revenge. Those who attack us will be punished.”

The logic is a tad fishy.  But it is not obvious that you should reveal a doomsday device if you have one.  It is impossible to prove that you have one so if it really had a deterrent effect you would announce you have one even if you don’t.  So it can’t have a deterrent effect.  And therefore you will always turn it off.

What you should worry about is announcing you have a doomsday device to an enemy who previously was not aware that there was such a thing.  It still won’t have any deterrent effect but it will surely escalate the conflict.  (via free exchange via Mallesh Pai.)

Put aside the question of why customers give tips.  That’s certainly a huge mystery but the fact is that many diners give tips and the level of tip depends on the quality of service.

In this article (via foodwire), a restauranteur explains why he decided against a switch to the European system of a fixed service charge.

We looked very hard at this [servis compris] policy fifteen years ago. We were going to call it “hospitality included.” We felt people who worked in the dining room were apologizing for being hospitality professional. I felt there was a resulting shame or lack of pride in their work. My assumption was that it was fueled by the tipping system, and I was troubled by the sense that the that tipping system takes a big part of the compensation decision out of the employer’s hands. So we brought up the “hospitality included” idea to our people. To our surprise, it turned out the staff actually enjoyed working for tips.

The tipping system encourages servers to put more weight on the diner’s welfare than the restauranteur would like, at least at the margin.  You can think of the waiter as selling you extra bread, more wine in your glass, and more attention at the expense of less generous (-looking) diners.  The restauranteur incurs the cost but the server earns the tip.

On the other hand, a fixed service charge provides too little incentive to take care of the customers.  You can think of a tipping system as outsourcing to the diner the job of monitoring the server.

(I once had a conversation on this topic with Toomas Hinnosaar and I am probably unconsciously plagiarising him.)

You spend too much on your credit card and/or forget to pay off your bill on time and get hit with late fees.  To commit to better behavior, you chop up your credit card and move to a debit card.  You avoid late fees by definition and it should help you commit to less spending as your bank balance acts as a natural upper bound on expenditure.

Dream on – the banks and credit card companies are too smart to give away profits like this.

They do two things.  First, you get “overdraft protection” meaning you can go over your bank balance at the cost of incurring fees of around $30/charge.  They make it very hard to turn down overdraft protection so you get a “service” you don’t really want.  In fact, it removes the commitment device you hoped to acquire by getting a debit card.  Second, as a I learned from watching this video, on a given day they debit your account in the order that maximizes the number of overdraft charges you incur (i.e they charge your account with bigger debits before smaller debits whatever the chronological order of the charges).

There is another effect:  the debit card selects for precisely those people who have the funds to pay their bills but lack the self-control to pay on time.  This is why they switch from a credit card to the debit card.   Credit cards are also used by people living beyond their means who might default.  These people do not get a debit card as they can’t afford the fees and they do not get the large credit line they need to spend like crazy.  This means a debit card is potentially more profitable to a bank than a credit card.  Banks have a great instrument for extracting surplus from sloppy consumers while avoiding bad risks.  So, confused consumers are still exploited, getting overdraft protection they don’t want and incurring fees that are unnecessary.

I’m typing this on my MacBook Pro, I walked to work listening to music on my iPhone but I have been shaken to my core by the videoclip in the middle of this page.

We talked a lot before about designing a scoring system for sports like tennis.  There is some non-fanciful economics based on such questions.  Suppose you have two candidates for promotion and you want to promote the candidate who is most talented.  You can observe their output but output is a noisy signal that depends not just on talent, but also effort both of which you cannot observe directly.  (Think of them as associates in a law firm.  You see how much they bill but you cannot disentangle hard work from talent.  You must promote one to partner where hard work matters less and talent matters more.)

How do you decide whom to promote?  The question is the same as how to design a scoring system in tennis to maximize the probability that the winner is the one who is most talented.

One aspect of the optimal contest seems clear.  You should let them set the rules.  If a candidate knows he has high ability he should be given the option to offer a handicap to his rival.  Only a truly talented candidate would be willing to offer a handicap.  So if you see that candidate A is willing to offer a higher handicap than candidate B, then you should reward A.

The rub is that you have to reward A, but give B a handicap.  Is it possible to do both?

If you are the owner of a large enterprise and are ready to retire, what do you do?  Sell to the highest bidder.  Before selling, do you want to split your firm into competing divisions and sell them off separately?  No, because, that would introduce competition, reduce market power and lower the bids so the sum total is lower than what you would get for the monopoly.  Searle, the drug company, sold itself off to Monsanto as one unit.

Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo, the Godfather of the Mexican illegal drug industry, lived a peaceful life as a rich monopolist.   Then he was caught in 1989 and decided to sell off his business.  In principle, Gallardo should sell off a monopoly just like Searle.  But he did not (see end of article)  The difference is that property rights are well defined in a legal business so Searle belongs to Monsanto.  But Gallardo can’t commit not to sell the same thing twice as property rights are not well-defined.  There is also considerable secrecy so it’s hard to know if the territory you are buying was already sold to someone else before.  And after you’ve sold one bit for a surplus, you have the incentive to sell of another chuck as you ignore the negative impact of this on the first buyer.

The result is that selling illegal drug turf results in a more competitive market than the ex ante ideal.  As the business is illegal anyhow, all the gangs can shoot it out to capture someone else’s territory.  Exactly what’s happening now.

The centerpiece of Greg Mankiw’s column in the New York Times is this paragraph about the little white pill he takes every day:

Not long ago, I read that a physician estimated that statins cost $150,000 for each year of life saved. That approximate figure reflects not only the dollars patients and insurance companies spend on the treatment but also — and just as important — an estimate of how effective it is in prolonging life. (That number is for men. Women have a lower risk of heart disease.)

Mankiw used the word cost but I would be that what he is referring to is price. With monopolized drugs and dysfunctional health care insurance there is a huge difference between price and cost.  And with this in mind, Mankiw’s column completely misses the real economic problem exemplified by his pills.

That seems to be the thesis of this paper by neurobiologist Jerome Siegel:

Sleep can be seen as an adaptive state that benefits animals by increasing the efficiency of their activity. It does this by suppressing activity at times that have maximal predator risk and minimal opportunity for efficiently meeting vital needs, and by permitting activity at times of maximal food and prey availability and minimal predator risk.

I read this as arguing that if an animal is not sleeping it will do things that are not in its interest.  So sleep stops it from doing those things. Of course natural selection could instead have simply taught the animal not to do what’s against its self interest but instead, under this theory, sleep acts like a commitment device to blunt a self-control problem.

Via neuroskeptic.

Start when he is 13 months old:

(sorry for the low quality.  two years ago = ancient technology.)  Yes at that age a child can be taught to float.  In fact almost no teaching is required.  You place the child on his back, he floats.  He cries too, it turns out.  A lot.  That’s why its not me there teaching him to float.  Instead it is a highly trained swimming teacher and one of the most inspirational people I have ever known.  That year was our kids’ first year of swimming lessons with him and we have been spending the summer in La Jolla, CA every year since primarily because of him and these swimming lessons.  10 minute lessons, daily for four weeks.

Here is what he learned last year when he was 2. (rss readers probably need to click through to the blog to see the video.)

A 2 year, 2month old child can learn to kick with his face in the water, roll over onto his back when he needs to breathe, and then continue on.  And at this early age he learns something which is subtle but which is central to swimming at every level:  looking at the floor to point the top of your head in the direction you are swimming and getting a breath by rotating on that axis.  The hardest thing to teach the child is not to look where he is going.  Looking where you are going means tilting your head up and that pushes your body down and makes you sink. For a two-year-old that is a deal-breaker, but even among adults head orientation is what distinguishes good swimmers from the best swimmers.

Here is how you teach a two-year-old to look at the floor.

Many repetitions of placing the child in the water, putting your hand deep under water and tell him to swim and grab the hand.  He has to look down to find your hand.  The typical swimming teacher hold out his hands near the surface of the water which instead trains the child to look up, a disaster.  This tiny difference has an enourmous impact on how smoothly the child can learn to swim.

It also teaches the child to go slow.  Another subtlety with swimming is that moving your arms and legs faster usually makes you go slower.  Slowing down all of the movements teaches him how to move more efficiently through the water.

This summer, at age 3 years 2 months he reached the stage where he could swim by himself without an adult in the pool with him, keeping himself going with the swim-float-swim sequence.  Then he began to learn to swim with his arms.

Next summer:  how to tech a four-year-old to snorkel.

sandeepShort weekend trips from Evanston lead to the Chicago Botanic Garden.  It can be quite beautiful despite the drone of cars from the freeway running next to the garden.  There are houses and malls all around and it is hard to escape the feeling that the garden is an artificial green oasis plonked into suburbia.

Just some the reasons why Drumlin Farm, just forty minutes away from our present abode in Boston, was such a big hit.  The garden aspect we enjoy in Chicago is replaced by a spectacular working farm.  There are many short trails and vegetables and eggs for sale, not just for display.  Plus sledding in the winter.  We joined the Audubon society as we expect many visits during the year.

photo

  1. The unbundled economy.
  2. Not a placebo.
  3. A man’s salute to Patrick Swayze. (consider yourself warned.)

We all work for google now.  Previous posts on reCAPTCHA here and here.  beanie bow:  lance fortnow.

I wrote

If I am of average ability then the things I see people say and do should, on average, be within my capabilities.  But most of the things I see people say and do are far beyond my capabilities.  Therefore I am below average.

I am illustrating a fallacy of course, but it is one that I suspect is very common because it follows immediately from a fallacy that is known to be common.  People don’t take into account selection effects.  The people who get your attention are not average people.  Who they are and what they say and do are subject to selection at many levels.  First of all they were able to get your attention.  Second, they are doing what they are best at which is typically not what you are best at.  Also, they are almost always imitating or echoing somebody else who is even more talented and specialized so as to have gotten their attention.

Its healthy to recognize that you can be the world leader at being you even if you suck at everything else.

WordPress give statistics on keyword searches that led users to Cheap Talk.  I am amused and intrigued by many of the leaders:

#1 cheap talk

#2 tv

??  About 20 times a day somebody googles tv, they are offered up a link to our blog and they click through.  The clicking through part I can understand but why a search on tv hits us is beyond me (when I try it I go through several pages of google hits and do not find a cheap talk link.)  And who googles “tv” ?

#8 hefty smurf

That one is my favorite.  I get a daily chuckle out of that one.

#9 flatfish

~#20 Wynne Godley

~#30 talking robots

~#33 model men

nice!

~#50 men and their mothers

oops.

~#60 Guinness serving temperature

I am pleased to be the go-to authority on the proper serving temperature of this important beverage.

If I am of average ability then the things I see people say and do should, on average, be within my capabilities.  But most of the things I see people say and do are far beyond my capabilities.  Therefore I am below average.

X-inefficiency at output q is the difference between the realized cost of production at q and the minimum cost of producing q.

If firms are maximizing profits, the difference is zero.  But there are many reasons why they might differ.  One is lack of competition.  The rough argument is that a monopoly has less incentive to minimize costs because it can absorb X-inefficiency in the form of reduced profits without going bankrupt.  Here is a video of X-inefficiency:

Let’s say you read a big book about recycling because you want to make an informed decision about whether it really makes sense to recycle.  The book is loaded with facts: some pro, some con.  You read it all, weigh the pluses and minuses and come away strongly convinced that recycling is a good thing.

But you are human and you can only remember so many facts.  You are also a good manager so you optimally allow yourself to forget all of the facts and just remember the bottom line that you were quite convinced that you should recycle.

This is a stylized version of how we set personal policies.  We have experiences, collect data, engage in debate and then come to conclusions.  We remember the conclusions but not always the reasons.  In most cases this is perfectly rational.  The details matter only insofar as they lead us to the conclusions so as long as we remember the conclusions, we can forget about the reasons.

It has consequences however.  How do you incorporate new arguments?  When your spouse presents arguments against recycling, the only response you have available is “yes, that’s true but still I know recycling is the right thing to do.”  And you are not just being stubborn.  You are optimally responding to your limited memory of the reasons you considered carefully in the past.

In fact, we are probably built with a heuristic that hard-wires this optimal memory management.  Call it cognitive-dissonance, confirmatory-bias, whatever.  It is an optimal response to memory constraints to set policies and then stubbornly stick to them.