When do rational people seek militant leadership for their nation? By militant here, I mean bellicose or having an affinity for violent conflict. I have began thinking about this question while writing a paper on the rise of Nazism in Germany after World War 1. I would suggest that this question may be one of the most important for political theory. As a practical matter, we certainly do not want neighboring nations to choose militant leaders against us, and so we should avoid putting them in conditions that might cause them to do so. Thus, we need to understand what might cause normal rational citizens to support militant candidates for leadership of their nation.
People normally have very good reasons to not want militant national leaders. We are all at risk when our leader would not hesitate to send our loved ones and ourselves off to die in battle. To preserve the blessings of peace, we should normally prefer to have leaders of the nonmilitant sort, who have a healthy aversion to war.
But of course militant leaders can also have a positive deterrent effect. When we have a militant national leader, other nations might be less inclined to provoke any kind of trouble for us. So a perceived threat of deep invasion can create an incentive for us to seek a militant leader who can deter it. But we must also worry that a leader who has an affinity for war may take any opportunities that he can get to make one for us. This potential cost of militancy is reduced, however, when the serious risks of war seem remote from our borders. Thus, the incentive to seek militant leadership may be strongest when we fear a long-term or low-probability threat of a deeply destructive invasion but otherwise the immediate risks of conflict seem small.
This recipe was fulfilled in Germany around 1930. The post-WW1 reparations involved a persistent implicit Allied threat to invade Germany if it did not pay, but the immediate risks of militancy became remote after Allied troops withdrew from the Rhineland under the Young Plan of 1929.
Such conditions also existed in America after the attack of September 11, 2001. We felt profoundly vulnerable to deep invasion, but the immediate risks of our own militant posturing seemed remote. And indeed, a demonstrated willingness to use military force became a positive asset in American presidential politics for several years in the aftermath of the attack. We should understand that, even in America, politics could become more militant under such conditions.
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September 11, 2011 at 9:33 am
Noam
Is the question “When do rational people seek militant leadership for their nation?” the same as “When should rational nations act militantly?” ?
September 11, 2011 at 9:59 am
ja
It wouldn’t seem that America at 9/11 fits an answer to your question, given that George Bush was elected before 9/11. Perhaps the Bush/Kerry race in 2004 would fit, but it would seem a stretch. You would also need to look at what perceptions voters had of candidates before the election. A related question would be how does a leader effectively get across that he is militant without unnerving voters. Actually this would seem crucial to your theory.
September 11, 2011 at 9:53 pm
bellisaurius
I always thought it was national listlessness. My impression from history (roman, french, german, etc..) is that people perceive either weakness or ineffectiveness from their goverrnent, and then crave someone to do something. I’d imagine the more bellicose the person, the more likely they appear to able to overcome national apathy/failure, it seems pretty rational.
I wonder how many of the militant folk are brought in by a minority interest (see also hitler’s election results). 30% of a given population is probably always militant. The real question may be more in line with “why does most of the other 70% just let it happen against their personal interests?” Fear of an imminent external or internal threat is probably the most obvious, but I’d imagine generalized anxiety does to (food shortage, for example).
September 13, 2011 at 5:22 pm
kerokan
I don’t believe the belligerence story much. Majorities rarely support the crazy schemes of warmongers. For every simplistic account of Hitler or Milosevic riding the waves of nationalism or religious fanaticism, you can find a more careful analysis that shows the incredible amount of dissent against those leaders and the repression they had to apply to remain in power while taking their countries to hell.