I am attending a workshop organized by Eli Berman at UCSD. Eli and his co-authors have been studying the military surge in Afghanistan. Colonel Joe Felter, a key member of the research team, presented an overview of the theory of counterinsurgency (COIN) – How can the Afghan government and the US forces “win hearts and minds”?
Think of Apple and Samsung competing for consumers. In the end, a consumer hands over some cash and gets an iPad or a Galaxy. Both sides of the exchange have sealed the deal, an exchange of a product for money. The theory of COIN works the same way. Two potential governments compete for allegiance from an undecided population. They offer them security and public goods in exchange for allegiance. They may also use coercion and violence to compel compliance. There is a key difference – an Afghan citizen can take the goodies offered by the U.S., claim he will offer his allegiance and then withhold it. The exchange takes place over time and there is no “contract” that guarantees payment of allegiance for US bounty.
The Afghans will offer their allegiance to the government that will be around in the long run. And the Taliban tell them, “The Americans have watches but we have the time.” And this strategic issue undercuts the theory of COIN. How can the surge work if one of the firms that is trying to sell you a product won’t be around to honor the warranty?
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June 21, 2011 at 10:24 pm
Peter St Onge
Good points. Unless the US credibly signals it will stay forever (ie annexes), there is no way to gain commitment from the Afghan people. Which implies it’s pointless to stay, logically.
Ah, but we’re not talking logic here, we’re talking politics. The US will stay until some President can find a nice moment to declare victory and run away without looking weak on terror.
Which unfortunately may be a number of decades in the future.
June 21, 2011 at 10:24 pm
Tyler W
I think the problem here is that US strategy in Afghanistan is not designed as a COIN strategy. At no point have U.S. troop levels matched what is necessary for successful counter-insurgency. Only McChrystal and Petraeus pushed for the strategy, and the administration has repeatedly declared that their aim is to “reverse the Taliban’s momentum” and establish a minimum level of security so that the Afghan government can provide competing services to the Taliban in the hopes that a power-sharing agreement can be reached.
Additionally, this whole notion is motivated by a false dichotomy. Afghans aren’t choosing between the U.S. and the Taliban for their future; it’s between the current Afghan government and the Taliban. This makes our job much more challenging; and again, lends no credibility to the notion that we are engaging in counter-insurgency.
July 7, 2011 at 4:38 pm
rjd100
The basic strategy is wrong and ignorant of basic geopolitical international relations theory. Afghanistan is a failed state, the govt is too weak on its own to control its territory. So there will be a hegemon. Long-term that cannot be the USA, which is too far away and has no real strategic interest in Afghanistan, other than seeing that AlQuaeda cannot use it as a base.
The regional hegemon with the greatest interest in the future of Afghanistan is Pakistan, which needs to control the Afghan government to prevent encirclement by India. What should have been done was to work with Pakistan to erect a Pakistani-controlled regime that at the same time would agree to prevent alQuaeda from using Afghanistan as a base. That strategy would have a stong chance of working, and would be far cheaper than the avenues we are currently pursuing.
Discussing time, competing Afghan governments, or counterinsurgency is missing the big picture.