For the operative who is confused about polite, Talibany behavior, the senior leadership has been kind enough to offer a code of conduct. It is written in a spartan and logical fashion, point by point, a bit like the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Number 15 is their policy on torture:
If some one admits that he is spy because you forced or tortured him, that does not make this person a spy and you can’t punish him. lt is prohibited for a Mujahid to promise to someone that if he admits then he will not be killed, he will be let go, or will not be tortured. There are two kinds of promises: the first is forcing, like you are telling him if you admit then we will let you go or we are not going torture you or put you in jail. lf you use force to cause admission, this is not legitimate. Second, you do not use force but you tell him that if you admit we will give you money or a high ranking position. This method also is not legitimate.
They recognize the possibility of false confessions using stick-based incentives like torture. Interestingly, the humble Mujahid is not even allowed to use carrot-based incentives. There is a problem of generating false confessions from an informant who just wants to get a reward.
The Taliban also know a little elementary implementation theory. One method to determine if someone is a spy is if (point 14): “There are two witnesses
that testify such person is a spy” (my emphasis). We can improve incentives to tell the truth if we can cross-check what one person reports against what another reports. If only one person says someone is a spy, there is the possibility the informant is lying for some reason – personal animosity, theft of the purported spy’s possessions once he is killed or incarcerated etc. But if we require two informants to say the person in question is a spy, if the two contradict each other, the senior Taliban can at the very least investigate further. The simplest way to encourage truthtelling is to punish both informants if they contradict each other. The document does not elaborate on this and relies on ambiguity of outcome (fear of repercussions?) to suffice to give incentives. The contract is incomplete in other words….another issue that is a concern of mechanism design and contract theory.
I didn’t see any repeated games insights though. Maybe in the next version.
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December 1, 2009 at 2:34 pm
Anonymous
Numbers 2 and 3 may be inspired by grim-trigger strategies and optimal penal codes, and number 5 certainly seems to have an element of Markov-perfect equilibria in repeated games of one-sided imperfect information…
December 2, 2009 at 1:16 am
Kerimcan
I think it is strange that the Taliban offer no reward to a member who captures a hostage. Hostages cannot be returned for money; they need to be turned over to the provincial authority who will decide their fate.
I wonder if this policy results in more deaths for the Coalition. Probably taking someone hostage is more costly than killing him on the spot (you need to keep an eye on the person, there is the risk of escape and informing the enemy, you may need to share food and so on) and without any material compensation the Taliban members may choose not to bother and simply kill the potential hostage. This outcome is good for the Taliban member but presumably bad for the Taliban leaders and the Coalition.
December 8, 2009 at 8:25 pm
designfollow
I read a few topics
thank you