Tyler Cowen asks why do people lose originality as they gain influence? There are two observationally equivalent ways to explain it.
- Since nobody really knows anything more than anybody else, opinion-rendering boils down to a game where everybody makes a random guess. The outcome of this game is that one person says something unconventional that turns out to be right. (by pure luck.) He gets noticed for that. Influence is the reward for being noticed. (We don’t have to assume that the public is unaware that he is just as ignorant as everyone else. The public is just trying to coordinate on whom to listen to. Winning the random-guessing game makes him a focal point.) Having influence is nice and in order not to jeopardize that he goes on saying the same thing as before which turned out to be right and is now conventional wisdom.
- Since nobody really knows anything more than anybody else, opinion-rendering boils down to a game where everybody makes a random guess. And people go on making random guesses over and over. People whose guesses are right get noticed and get influence, the more unconventional the guess the more you get noticed. Its very rare that something really unconventional is correct, so the people who repeatedly make unconventional guesses eventually lose influence. It follows that those that survive this game for a long time are those whose random guesses were unconventional once and conventional the remainder of the time. We forget about all of the others.
Tyler asked for case studies. But given the nature of the question what he really wants is a theory that generates a forecast that we can test against future data. So as you guessed from the title, my case study is Noriel Roubini. In 10 years he will either continue to be a regular talking head who no longer says anything unconventional (theory 1) or he will continue to make unconventional guesses and will have lost influence and be forgotten (theory 2).

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March 18, 2009 at 8:32 am
eric
Note that Roubini’s “everything is a disaster’ spiel is suspiciously like Ravi Batra’s 1990 Depression call. Poor Batra was just 18 years early, but the mechanism was the same (everything will blow up).
While your theory is pretty good for Roubini-types, what about Tyler Cowen, Krugman, or Brad DeLong. They are popular names on economic policy, and their signature qualification is that they are experts. I don’t think their seminal works were really original. Their key was really doing yeoman work, demonstrating perhaps exceptional competence. Then, they flood the zone with opinions on health care to monetary policy, and for dilettante intellectuals (ie, journalists) they are go-to sources for conventional expert wisdom, but only as long as they don’t take a stand that seems overall reasonable. Thus, a free marketer notes he is for unemployment insurance and helping those facing foreclosure, while a Keynesian notes that the market may be a bad master, but a useful servant. The key is appearing reasonable, making top-down vs. anarchic mechanisms on a ‘case by case’ basis.
March 18, 2009 at 10:27 am
Encore un nouveau blog intéressant « Rationalité Limitée
[…] aussi beaucoup ce billet qui se demande pourquoi au fur et à mesure qu’un intellectuel ou un scientifique gagne en […]
March 18, 2009 at 11:59 am
David C.
Note in proof; Joe Granville. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Granville
March 20, 2009 at 11:46 pm
jeff
nice.
March 18, 2009 at 1:32 pm
John Hall
You could have a commentator who switches. Sometimes they will follow the consensus and sometimes they will make unconditional calls. For instance, let’s say I have confidence in my views of x and I weight by view vs. the consensus view depending on the confidence in my views. So if I have nothing interesting to say, I will basically agree with the talking heads and the consensus. However, when I’m confident in my view, then I would want to emphasize my unconventional side. In this sense, I would go through cycles of being mainstream and being a maverick. This makes sense since most of the time the market is right, but when it’s wrong are the greatest opportunities to outperform.