Jeff Miron writes

If the CIA had convincingly foiled terrorists acts based on information from harsh interrogations, the temptation to shout it from the highest rooftops would have been overwhelming.

Thus the logical inference is that harsh interrogations have rarely, if ever, produced information of value.

Without taking a stand on the bottom-line conclusion, I wonder about the intermediate claim.  If, for example, the CIA can document that torture produced critical intelligence, when would be the optimal time to release that information?  There are many reasons to wait until an investigation is already underway.

  1. If it was already in the public record, that would be in effect a sunk-cost for prosecutors and have less effect on marginal incentives to go forward.
  2. Public information maximizes its galvanizing effect when the public is focused on it.  Watercooler conversations are easier to start when it is common-knowledge that your cubicle-neighbor is paying attention to the same story you are.
  3. Passing time make even public information act less public.  Again, its not the information per se, but the galvanizing effect of getting the public focused on the same facts.  Over time these facts can be spun, not to mention simply forgotten.

I expect that the success stories are there as a kind of poison pill against the investigators.  They will reach a point where any further progress will require that the positive results will come to light.

The US Open is here. From the Straight Sets blog, food for thought about the design of a scoring system:

A tennis match is a war of attrition that is won after hundreds of points have been played and perhaps a couple of thousand shots have been struck.On top of that, the scoring system also very much favors even the slightly better player.

“It’s very forgiving,” Richards said. “You can make mistakes and win a game. Lose a set and still win a match.”

Fox said tennis’s scoring system is different because points do not all count the same.

“Let’s say you’re in a very close match and you get extended to set point at 5-4,” Fox said, referring to a best-of-three format. “There may be only four or five points separating you from you opponent in the entire match. And yet, if you win that first set point, you’ve essentially already won half the match. Half the match! And not only that — your opponent goes back to zero. They have to start completely over again. And the same thing happens in every game, not just each set. The loser’s points are completely wiped out. So there are these constant pressure points you’re facing throughout the match.”

There are two levels at which to assess this claim, the statistical effect and the incentive effect.  Statistically, it seems wrong to me.  Compare tennis scoring to basketball scoring, i.e. cumulative scoring.  Suppose the underdog gets lucky early and takes an early lead.  With tennis scoring, there is a chance to consolidate this early advantage by clinching a game or set.  With cumulative scoring, the lucky streak is short-lived because the law of large numbers will most likely eradicate it.

The incentive effect is less clear to me, although my instinct suggests it goes the other way.  Being a better player might mean that you are able to raise your level of play in the crucial points.  We could think of this as having a larger budget of effort to allocate across points.  Then grouped scoring enables the better player to know which points to spend the extra effort on.  This may be what the latter part of the quote is getting at.

In the National Interest, they make an explicit link between the Prisoner’s Dilemma and environmental degradation:

HOW DOES one escape a dilemma in which multiple individuals acting in their own rational self-interest can ultimately destroy a shared limited resource—even when it is clear this serves no one in the long run?

In 1968, Science published Garrett Hardin’s landmark article “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Hardin relied on the metaphor of a small English village in the eighteenth century. Each family has a house with a small plot of land for growing vegetables. In addition, there is a large, common area used by all the villagers to graze their livestock. Each villager has a cow or two that provide the family with its milk. The common area is large enough to support the entire village. Then the village begins to grow. Families get larger, and procure an extra cow. New families move in. Suddenly, the common is threatened; it is being overgrazed. Grass is consumed so fast that there is not enough time for it to replenish itself before rains erode the topsoil. Each cow no longer has quite enough to eat, and thus yields less milk than it did before. If the overuse of the common continues, there will be a slow but sure decrease in the number of animals it can support until, finally, it becomes useless for grazing.

We are now dealing with a tragedy of the global commons. There is one earth, one atmosphere and one water supply, and 6 billion people are sharing it. Badly. The wealthy are overgrazing, and the poor can’t wait to join them. Examples are plentiful: the overharvesting of trees by lumber companies; the overplanting of land by farmers; the overdevelopment of suburban communities; the extraction of petroleum from a common pool by oil companies; and the overcrowding of highways and other public facilities. These behaviors make whatever benefits users derive from those resources vanishingly small. The issues are as far ranging as contamination of water by toxic wastes, pollution of the atmosphere by carbon dioxide and various particulates, and profligate use of water and energy.

(HT: Shimi Lin)

Ohio has approved bringing slot machines to race tracks, expecting to bring in close to $1 billion in taxes and license fees.

“Look, we are one of the few large states in the country that fixed our budget problems without raising taxes,” [Chairman of the State Democratic Party Chris] Redfern said.

Ohio is far from alone when it comes to budget problems. According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, a Washington-based think tank, every state but Montana and North Dakota is up against shortfalls in the 2009 and 2010 fiscal years.

Politicians are turning to gambling to help close that gap, sometimes with the backing of voters. For example, in the 2008 election cycle, Colorado voters backed the expansion of table gaming and betting limits at casinos; Missouri voters approved the end of “loss limits” during casino sessions.

Meanwhile, Delaware’s legislature has legalized sports betting in casinos, although that is being fought in the courts by the major professional sports leagues. Pennsylvania and Illinois are moving to place video poker machines in bars.

NPR had the story.

Ethan Iverson is a powerful force.  I heard him once say something like “By day I study jazz traditions, and by night, with the Bad Plus, I reject them.”  Here he is solidifying his cred on the first count with an unbelievable flurry of posts on Lester Young who was born 100 years ago this week.  Here you have “A Beginner’s Guide to the Master Takes,” “Miles Davis and Lester Young,” and piano transcriptions of famous Pres solos!!  All in all, 10 monumental articles.

A recent article in Wired about increases in the placebo effect over time has provoked much discussion.  Here, for example, is a good counterpoint from Mindhacks.

But let’s assume that placebo is indeed a potentially effective treatment for psychological reasons.  When you are a subject in a placebo-controlled study you are told that the drug you are taking is a placebo with probability p.  Presumably, the magnitude of the placebo effect depends on p, with smaller p implying larger placebo effect.

This means there is a socially optimal p.  That is, if doctors were to prescribe placebo as a part of standard practice, they should do so randomly and with the optimal probability p.  Will they?

No, due to a problem akin to the Tragedy of the Commons.  An individual doctor’s incentive to prescribe placebo is based on trading off the cost and benefits to his own patients.  But the socially optimal placebo rate is based on a trade-off of the benefit to the individual patient versus the cost to the overall population.  That cost arises because everytime a doctor gives placebo to his patient, this raises p and lowers the effectiveness of placebo to all patients.

So doctors will use placebo too often.

The new Miyazaki film, distributed by Disney. I recommend it whether or not you go with small children, but be prepared. The animation is beautiful as usual, although it won’t stand out alongside Spirited Away or Tortoro. At times it looks like Yellow Submarine which is an interesting departure.

No, what’s really intriguing about this film, despite what some critics are saying is the plot. There is a very creative and wonderful plot. Astounding things happen. And yet at the end it feels empty and unfulfilled. You will notice the reason. There are no bad guys, no conflict, no tension, and almost no uncertainty about the conclusion.

I don’t expect a film like that, even (especially?) one for small children to do well with an American audience. It’s natural to compare with the Pixar films because Pixar is heavily influenced by Miyazaki and John Lasseter is involved with marketing Miyazaki in the US.

Up was 40% Miyazaki and 40% Murakami. But the other 20% was Stephen J Cannell. Even that 20% was barely enough to sell an otherwise epic film.

For the remainder of the week, I will be packing up and heading back to Chicago.  Summer is over.  Blogging will be light until I get back.  If you are new to the blog and want to catch up on what’s here, here is a rough guide.  The meat tofu and potatoes of the blog appear under the tags Economics, Game Theory, and Incentives.  Sandeep and I also write a lot on the subject of Food and Wine.

But, my favorite content is collected in the tags Banana Seeds and Vapor Mill.

Banana Seeds:  seeds are meant to suggest ideas (did you know that “seminal” has the root “sem” which is latin-or-something for seeds.)  But bananas don’t really have seeds, or at least the seeds they have are kinda pointless since that is not how bananas propogate.  So Banana Seeds suggests pointless ideas. (It also has a lewd connotation.)

Vapor Mill:  Academics are supposed to be “paper mills:” cranking out articles.  The posts with this tag are ideas that conceivably could lead to real papers, but either because we are too lazy or not expert enough in the field, will instead probably just remain “vapor.”  (There is another lewd connotation here too.)

Phrenology was the attempt to correlate physical features of the brain and skull with personality, intellect, creativity.  You got your data by plundering graves.

The three categories of individuals who were most interesting for finding out about the human mind were criminals, the insane, and geniuses, in the sense that they represented the extreme versions of the human mind …. It was easy enough to get the heads of criminals and the insane. Nobody wanted these, really. You could go to any asylum cemetery and root around and not be bothered, or hang out at the gallows and scoop up an executed criminal. Those two were pretty easy. Getting the heads of geniuses proved to be considerably more difficult.

Among the genius heads stolen and studied by phrenologists was Joseph Haydn’s.

U.S. producers are allowed to grow a certain amount of cane and beets each year for which they are guaranteed a price set by USDA. Beets get 55 percent of the total quota allotment and cane gets 45 percent. This works like a closed shop. If you want to start growing beets or cane for domestic sugar production, too bad. Catch 22: You only get to have a quota if you already have a quota. As for tariffs: The 2008 Farm Bill says that 85 percent of total sugar in the U.S. must be produced domestically, and only 15 percent can be imported. That 15 percent comes in through quotas distributed among about 20 countries. Any other sugar they want to send us is subject to high tariffs, except from Mexico. Under NAFTA, Mexico can export as much sugar to us as it wants to at the favored price. But imported sugar is never supposed to exceed 15 percent.

This interview covers a variety of angles including the history of sugar protection, high-fructose corn syrup, and the sugar “crisis.”

What happens when you put someone in a dense forest, tell them to walk for an hour in a straight line and track them with GPS? They do this (top left.)

Their walking patterns were similar those of blindfolded walkers (right) and very different from those walking in a desert (bottom.) The results suggest that a good reference point (the sun in the case of the desert) helps. And the lack of a consistent turning direction rules out the hypothesis (believe it or not) that the tendency to walk in circles is due to asymmetrical leg lengths.

Read the article from Not Exactly Rocket Science.

Addendum: I bet that if they were swimming instead of walking you would see consistent circles.

  1. Performance degrading drugs.  Also, how to make love and not war.
  2. A book on wine to retail for $1 million.  (Comes with wine.)
  3. Inkonomics.

I teach a class at Kellogg on “Strategic Crisis Management”.  It deals with crises that are triggered by a conflict between moral values and profit-maximization.  A student from a class I taught earlier this year, Jason Gilroy, told me about the song United Breaks Guitars by Dave Carroll:

Five million hits later, United is making amends.  If you search YouTube you’ll find further videos by Dave and various responses.

We have all heard about problems of overfishing and how quotas and incentive mechanisms have been effective in slowing the depletion of stocks of endangered fish.  But while over-utilization of a common resource can be addressed with such measures, it is trickier to implement schemes that incentivize investment toward actively replenishing depleted fisheries.   The problem is that any actor bears all of the investment cost but, given the common pool, enjoys only a small fraction of the benefits.

Enter Giant Robotic Roaming Fish Farms.  These are essentially mobile fences in the sea that have the potential of bringing the benefits of coastal fish farming to the open waters solving a number of traditional problems.

Traditional fish farms typically consist of cages submerged in shallow, calm waters near shore, where they are protected from the weather and easily accessible for feeding and maintenance.

But raising fish in such close quarters can contribute to the spread of disease among the animals, and wastes may foul the waters. Cages must be moved to keep the waters clean and the fish healthy.

Deepwater cages offer cleaner, more freely circulating ocean water and natural food, which can yield tastier fish.

Fences create property rights and property rights solve incentive problems.  As an illustration, here is a remarkable paper demonstrating the rapid advances in agricultural development in the American plains that coincided with the invention of barbed wire.

Suppose I want to send you an email and be sure that it will not be caught in your spam filter. What signal can I use to prove to you that my message is not spam? It must satisfy (at least) two requirements.

  1. It should be cheaper/easier for legitimate senders to use than for spammers.
  2. It should be cheap overall in absolute terms.

The first is necessary if the signal is going to effectively separate the spam from the ham. The second is necessary if the signal is going to be cheap enough for people to actually use it.

It is easy to think of systems that meet the first requirement but very hard to think of one that also satisfies the second. Now researchers at Yahoo! have an intriguing new idea that has received a great deal of attention, CentMail. According to this article, Yahoo! is planning to roll it out soon.

The sender pays a penny to have a trusted server to affix an electronic “stamp” to the message. Given that spammers could not afford to pay even one cent per message given the massive volume of spam, the receiver can safely accept any stamped message without running it through his spam filter.

Now here is the key idea. The penny is paid to charity. How could this matter? Because most people already make sizable donations to charity every year, they can simply route these donations through CentMail making the stamps effectively free. Thus, condition 2 is satisfied.

The first question that comes to mind is the titular one. (Settle down Beavis.) Remember, we still have to worry about condition 1 and whatever magic we use to make it cheap for legitimate email better not have the same effect on spam. But just like you, any spammer who makes donations to charity will be able to send a volume of spam for free. Apparently the assumption is that spam=evil and evildoers do not also contribute to charity. And we must also assume that Centmail doesn’t encourage entry into the spamming business by those marginal spammers for whom the gift to charity is enough to assuage their previous misgivings.

But these seem like reasonable assumptions. The more tricky issue is whether the 1 penny will actually deter spammers. It is certainly true that at current volume levels, the marginal piece of spam is not worth 1 penny. But for sure there is still a very large quantity of spam that is worth significantly more than 1 penny. For proof, just take a look in your snailbox. Even at bulk rates the cost of junk-mail advertising is several pennies per piece. With Centmail your Inbox would have at least as much stamped spam as the amount of junk mail in your snailbox.

This leads to the crucial questions. Any system of screening by monetary payments should be viewed with the following model in mind. First, ask how many pieces of spam you would expect to receive per day at the specified price. Next, ask how many spam you are willing to receive before you turn on your spam filter again. If the first number is larger than the second, then the system is not going to substitute for spam filtering and this undermines the reason to opt-in in the first place. For Centmail and me these numbers are 50 and 1.

Now continued spam filtering won’t necessarily destroy the system’s effectiveness. The stamp can be used in conjunction with standard filtering rules to reduce the chance your ham gets classified as spam. Then the question will be whether this reduction is enough to induce senders to adopt the setup costs of opting in.

Finally there is no reason theoretically that the total volume of spam would be reduced. Providing spammers with a second, higher class of service might only add to their demand.

My favorite reality show Top Chef is back and this time it’s in Vegas.  Sin City is not known for any special cuisine so the producers have opted to stir in the town’s most famous ingredient – gambling.  In each episode one chef is eliminated and we get to watch them fight and flirt till one is left standing many, many weeks from now.  So it’s a pretty big deal if you get a pass to the next round.  Because of the Vegas setting, one chef won this great prize by drawing a “gold chip”.  In the previous shows, you had to cook your way into this advantage in the “quickfire” round.  This round still remains but, at least in the first show, there is now the second random route into the next round.

What effect will this have?

As randomization is not a function of the ability of the contestants but winning the quickfire is, the average quality of the chefs in future rounds will go down compared to the previous series.  That’s the statistics angle.  The game theory angle is the impact on incentives.  The good chefs are going to find it easier than before as only the worst chef is eliminated. If a lower quality chef makes it via randomization, the others can slack off in the next round and conserve their energy and best dishes for the future.  The cooking will get worse.  The producers should drop the randomization trick if they want to see the best possible cooking.

Some of the trade-offs, both mathematical and psychological are discussed in this article from The Numbers Guy.  My favorite idea:

Dilip Soman: “I have a radical solution. Once a shopper is ready to check out, she wheels her cart into an area where she gets a number, and is directed to a lounge. Staff members scan and generate ‘invoices’ and once ready, the numbers are called out into the lounge area so that the customer can pay. The one thing that I don’t know is whether customers will feel some anxiety about not being in front of their groceries when they are being scanned, but if they don’t, I think this will be the most efficient solution!”

When animals move, forage or generally go about their lives, they provide inadvertent cues that can signal information to other individuals. If that creates a conflict of interest, natural selection will favour individuals that can suppress or tweak that information, be it through stealth, camouflage, jamming or flat-out lies. As in the robot experiment, these processes could help to explain the huge variety of deceptive strategies in the natural world.

The article at Not Exactly Rocket Science, describes an experiment in which robots competed for food at a hidden location and controlled a visible signal that could be used to reveal their location.  The robots adapted their signaling strategy by a process that simulates natural selection.  Eventually, the robots learned not to pay attention to others’ signals and the signals become essentially uninformative.

Paul Kedrosky is intrigued by a claim about golf strategy

While eating lunch and idly scanning subtitles of today’s broadcast of golf’s PGA Championship, I saw an analyst make an interesting claim. He said that the best putters in professional golf make more three putts (taking three putts to get the ball in the cup) than does the average professional golfer. Why? Because, he argued, the best putters hit the ball more firmly and confidently, with the result that if they miss their ball often ends up further past the hole. That causes them to 3-putt more often than do “lag” putters who are just trying to get the ball into the hole with no nastiness.

The hypothesis is that the better putters take more risks.  That is, there is a trade-off between average return (few putts on average) and risk (chance of a big loss:  three putts.)

His is a data-driven blog and he confronts the claim with a plot suggesting the opposite:  better putters have fewer three-puts.  However, there are reasons to quibble with the data (starting a long distance from the green, it would be nearly impossible to hole out with a single putt.  In these cases good putters will two-putt, average putters will three-putt.  The hypothesis is really about putting from around 10 feet and so the data needs to control for distance, as suggested to me by Mallesh Pai.  Alternatively, instead of looking at cross-sectional data we could get data on a single player and compare his risk-taking behavior on easier greens, where he is effectively a better putter, versus more difficult greens.)

And anyway, who needs data when the theory is relatively straightforward.  Any individual golfer has a risk-return tradeoff.  He can putt firmly and try to increase the chance of holing out in one, at the cost of an increase in the chance of a three-putt if he misses and goes far past the hole.  The golfer chooses the riskiness of his putts to optimize that tradeoff.  Now, we can formalize what it means to be a better putter:  for an equal increase in risk of a three-putt he gets a larger increase in the probability of a one-putt.  Then we can analyze how this shift in the PPF (putt-possibility-frontier) affects his risk-taking.

Textbook Econ-1 micro tells us that there are two effects that go in opposite directions.  First, the substitution effect tells us that because a better putter faces a lower relative price (in terms of increased risk) from going for a lower score, he will take advantage of this by taking more risk and consequently succumbing to more three-putts.  (This assumes diminishing Marginal Rate of Substitution, a natural assumption here.) But, there is an income effect as well.  His better putting skills enable him to both lower his risk and lower his average number of putts, and he will take advantage of this as well.  (We are assuming here that lower risk and lower score are both normal goods.) The income effect points in the direction of fewer three-putts.

So the theoretical conclusions are ambiguous in general, but there is one case in which the original claim is clearly borne out.  Consider putts from about 8 feet out.  Competent golfers can, if they choose, play safely and virtually ensure they will hole out with two putts.  Competent, but not excellent golfers, have a PPF whose slope is greater than 1:  to increase the probability of a 1-putt, they must increase by even more the probability of a three-putt.  Any movement along such a PPF away from the sure-thing two-putt not only increases risk, but also increases the expected number of putts.  Its unambiguosly a bad move.  So competent, but not excellent golfers will be at a corner solution on 8 foot putts, always two-putting.

On the other hand, better golfers have a flatter PPF and can, at least marginally, reduce their average number of putts by taking on risk.  Some of these better golfers, in some situations, will choose to do this, and run the risk of three-putting.

Thanks to Mallesh Pai for the pointer.

In a frightening new paper, Philip Munz, Ioan Hudea, Joe Imad, and Robert J. Smith say NO!   It’s such scary news that the BBC covered it.

In their model, Susceptible (S) humans can turn into Zombies (Z) with probability β if they meet each other.  But Zombies can also rise from dead susceptibles or the so-called Removed R at rate ς.  In a mixed population with no birth, S will definitely shrink.  Even if S kill Z at rate α,  Z can always re-appear from R and never die off.  Hence, we end up in a pure Zombie equilibrium.  There is no channel for S to grow and there is a channel for Z to grow and there you have it.

Of course, if there is birth then things change.  In their model, the authors look at the case where the (exogenous) birth rate Π is zero.  But the birth rate should also depend on the fractions of S and Z in the population.  If S is large then there should be frequent S-S encounters.  Assume away gender issues for simplicity and these S-S encounters should lead to progeny.  Even if the birth rate is low, it is multiplies by S-squared the chance of an S-S meeting while the zombie production rate βSZ + ςR is close to ςR if Z is close to zero.  If S is large, so ΠS > ςR, this stabilizes a good S equilibrium where a small fraction of zombies does not eventually take over.

This is a small trivial extension but with a  good title (“Make Love to win the Zombie War”), it would be an interesting sequel.

There is another solution: cremation is better than burial.  I’m not an expert on zombies but I strongly suspect a cremated body cannot reappear in zombie form.  Then, if we can kill of zombies fast enough (high α), we should be fine.  Phew.  But while the human race is safe, all individuals are in danger.  I will not sleep well tonight.

(Hat Tip: PLL)

Chopped is a show on the Food Network where four chefs compete to win $10K.  There are three knockout rounds/courses.  In each round, the remaining chefs get some mystery ingredients and have 30 minutes to cook four portions of a dish.  One chef is chopped each course by a panel of judges till one remains standing at the end of the dessert round.

In the show I watched tonight, the mystery ingredients in the first round were merguez sausage, broccoli and chives.  Chef Ming from Le Cirque tried to make chive crepes with a sausage and broccoli stuffing and a milk-broccoli stem sauce.  He used a fancy technique where he turned a frying pan upside down and cooked the crepe on the bottom of the pan.  He ran out of time and did not make the sauce.  Crepes turned out crap.  Basically things did not go too well and he was “chopped”.   Far weaker chefs made it to the next round.  But Ming’s strategy was wrong: he was one of the best chefs.  If he had not cooked a hard dish but a safe dish he would have made it into the next round.   This got me thinking about the optimal strategy for the game.  Here is my conjecture.

To win you have to cook at least one “home run” dish and two good dishes.  The third and final final dessert round seems to be the hardest.  This time the mystery ingredients were grape leaves, sesame seeds, pickled ginger and melon!  It was very challenging to make something edible with that, let alone creative and delicious.  If you are lagging (i.e. your opponent has had a home run in previous round and you have not), you have to go for a home run in the dessert round.  Otherwise, just do the best you can: the random choice of ingredients will play a  bigger rle in your success than your own effort.  Reasoning backwards, this implies that you have to go for a home run in one of the first two rounds.

In the second round is where I would try for one.  If the other two are going for home runs, I could still play safety and land in the middle.  I might do this if I already had a home run in the first round.  But if I played safety in the first round, I have to go for it now.  And it is likely that I’m in the latter scenario because in the first round you (at least if you are one of the better chefs) should not go for a home run as the only way you’re going to lose is if you come last out of four people.  Only the most mediocre chef should play a risky strategy in the first round as this is the only way to win (think of the John McCain picking Sarah Palin “Hail Mary Pass” strategy when he was lagging behind).  The other three should produce a nice, safe appetizer.  If they are truly the best three chefs they are likely to make it to the second round in equilibrium anyway.  And all three will have safety dishes.  And all three should go for home runs as the desert round is not a good time to attempt a great dish.

So, Ming did not get the game strategy right and he got knocked out earlier than he should have.   So future contestants take note of this blog entry.  I am also willing to provide consulting for chefs if they cook a free dinner for me.

The thing with having a blog is that it affects the way you see everything.  You can’t just let go and enjoy a movie, T.V. etc without the odd idea for a post popping into the back of your mind….So, last night I settled down to watch the first episode of “Mad Men” and I thought I concentrated fully and followed the plot. But now all I remember is that the new evil British guy (the Principal) appointed two people, Pete and Ken (the Agents) , “Head of Accounts” after sacking the sole previous incumbent.

This the classic incentive scheme recommended by the tournaments literature in contract theory. The main idea is that you get both Pete and Ken to work hard because if one underperforms relative to the other, he gets punished by lower wages, sacking etc.  Of course this transfers risk onto the agents and Pete particularly looked discomfited by the arrangement even though he got a promotion.  In fact, a classic paper by Bengt Holmstrom (which I already blogged about), recommends that this relative performance evaluation only be done if one agent’s output gives information about the other’s effort, otherwise you are just imposing risk without any incentive benefits.  So, if Pete and Ken were doing totally different jobs, the incentive scheme does not make any sense.  But since they are both working in Accounts if one, say Pete, does well and the other, Ken, does badly it signals that Ken might not have worked as hard as Pete.  If both do badly, it signals that the economy is bad and no-one shirked etc…So, it fits the theory.

One problem with relative performance evaluation is that Pete and Ken have an incentive to collude (Dilip Mookherjee pointed this out in his research).  Ken realizes this and suggests it to Pete but Pete turns him down.  Maybe there’s  a Prisoner’s Dilemma aspect to the collusion game or Pete was too emotional to get it.

Thought you were secure in a tenured job?  I guess if your whole department is eliminated, so are you:  The University of Southern Mississippi is getting rid of its economics department in its entirety:

The elimination of economics, along with five tenured and four tenure-track faculty positions, is part of a plan to reduce spending by $11 to $12 million, universitywide, within a year. While university officials stress the plan isn’t yet final, they are slated to decide by September 1 whether to go forward with the proposed cuts, according to a news release. Tenured and tenure-track faculty are legally required to a year’s notice prior to termination, and economics faculty say they’ve already received such notice.

It seems they are not producing enough graduates.

(HT: Tomas Sjostrom)

The link I posted previously was somewhat outdated as it mentioned only that furloughs were under consideration.  As a part of the recent budget agreement, the UC furlough is now a done deal.  Here are some more recent stories.

I have heard that, system-wide, professors will take an 8% cut in pay.  The word “furlough” usually means something like a temporary layoff.  Here it means that workers will have shorter hours and commensurately lower pay.  For example, UC non-faculty staff will have a few days off each month.

What are the marginal hours where Professors will be furloughed?  Saturdays.  That is, no classes will be cut, all administrative duties remain intact, pay is cut 8%.  Presumably this means that my colleagues in UC system will be doing 8% more surfing the web when they are not in the classroom.

At Legoland, admission is discounted for two-year-olds. But a child must be at least three for most of the fun attractions.

At the ticket window the parents are asked how old the child is. But at the ride entrance the attendants ask the children directly.

The parents lie. The children tell the truth.

  1. In Rhode Island, happy endings but no beginnings.
  2. Your food is trying to kill you.
  3. University of California professors furloughed.

Cheney is spilling the beans on “soft” Bush:

Cheney’s imprint on law and policy, achieved during the first term at the peak of his influence, had faded considerably by the time he and Bush left office. Bush halted the waterboarding of accused terrorists, closed secret CIA prisons, sought congressional blessing for domestic surveillance, and reached out diplomatically to Iran and North Korea, which Cheney believed to be ripe for “regime change.”

And

It was clear that Cheney’s doctrine was cast-iron strength at all times — never apologize, never explain — and Bush moved toward the conciliatory.

Via kottke.org, an article in New Scientist on the mathematics of gambling.  One bit concerns arbitrage in online sports wagering.

Let’s say, for example, you want to bet on one of the highlights of the British sporting calendar, the annual university boat race between old rivals Oxford and Cambridge. One bookie is offering 3 to 1 on Cambridge to win and 1 to 4 on Oxford. But a second bookie disagrees and has Cambridge evens (1 to 1) and Oxford at 1 to 2.

Each bookie has looked after his own back, ensuring that it is impossible for you to bet on both Oxford and Cambridge with him and make a profit regardless of the result. However, if you spread your bets between the two bookies, it is possible to guarantee success (see diagram, for details). Having done the calculations, you place £37.50 on Cambridge with bookie 1 and £100 on Oxford with bookie 2. Whatever the result you make a profit of £12.50.

I can verify that arbitrage opportunites abound.  In my research with Toomas Hinnosaar on sorophilia, we investigated an explanation involving betting.  In the process we discovered that the many online bookmakers often quote very different betting lines for basketball games.

How could bookmakers open themselves up to arbitrage and still stay in business?  Here is one possible story.  First note that, as mentioned in the quote above, no one bookmaker is subject to a sure losing bet.  The arbitrage involves placing bets at two different bookies.

Now imagine you are one of two bookmakers setting the point spread on a Clippers-Lakers game and your rival bookie has just set a spread of Lakers by 5 points.  Suppose you think that is too low and that a better guess at the spread is Lakers by 8 points.  What spread do you set?

Lakers by 6.  You create an arbitrage opportunity.  Gamblers can place two bets and create a sure thing:  with you they take the Clippers and the points.  With your rival they bet on the Lakers to cover.  You will win as long as the Lakers win by at least 7 points, which is favorable odds for you (remember you think that Lakers by 8 is the right line.)  Your rival loses as long as the the Lakers win by at least 6 points, which is unfavorable odds for your rival.  You come away with (what you believe to be) a winning bet and you stick your rival with a losing bet.

Now this begs the question of why your rival stuck his neck out and posted his line early.  The reason is that he gets something in return: he gets all the business from gamblers wishing to place bets early.  Put differently, when you decided to wait you were trading off the loss of some business during the time his line is active and yours is not versus the gain from exploiting him if he sets (what appears to you to be) a bad line.

Since both of you have the option of playing either the “post early” or “wait and see” strategy, in equilibrium you must both be indifferent so the costs and benefits exactly offset.

Of course, with online bookmaking the time intervals we are talking about (the time only one line is active before you respond, and the time it takes him to adjust to your response, closing the gap) will be small, so the arbitrage opportunities will be fleeting.  (As acknowledged in the New Scientist article.)

Blame it on the binding constraint.

Let me explain.  Has it ever struck you how peculiar it is that the price of so much writing these days is zero?  No, I don’t mean that it is suprising that blogs don’t charge a price.  There is so much supply that competition drives the price down to zero.

What I mean is, why are so many blogs priced at exactly zero.  It would be a complete fluke for the optimal price of all of the blogs in the world to be at exactly the same number, zero.

And indeed the optimal price is not zero, in fact the optimal price is negative. Bloggers have such a strong incentive to have their writings read that they would really like to pay their readers.  But for various reasons they can’t and so the best they can do is set the price as low as possible.  That is, as it often happens, the explanation for the unlikely bunching of prices at the same point is that we are all banging up against a binding constraint.

(Why can’t we set negative prices?  First of all, we cannot verify that you actually read the article.  Instead we would have people clicking on links, pretending to read, and collecting money.  And even if we could verify that you read the article, most bloggers wouldn’t want to pay just anybody to read.  A blogger is usually interested in a certain type of audience.  A non-negative price helps to screen for readers who are really interested in the blog, usually a signal that the reader is the type that the blogger is after.)

Now, typically when incentives are blunted by a binding constraint, they find expression via other means, distortionary means.  And a binding price of zero is no different.  Since a blogger cannot lower his price to attract more readers, he looks for another instrument, in this case the quality of the writing.

Absent any constraint, the optimum would be normal-quality writing, negative price. (“Normal quality” of course is blogger-specific.)  When the constraint prevents price from going negative, the response is to rely more heavily on the quality variable to attract more readers.  Thus quality is increased above its unconstrained optimal point.

So, the next time you are about to complain that the blogs you read are too interesting (at the margin), remember this, grin and bear it.

The NY Times has an article about a new wave of independent films and their marketing.

When “The Age of Stupid,” a climate change movie, “opens” across the United States in September, it will play on some 400 screens in a one-night event, with a video performance by Thom Yorke of Radiohead, all paid for by the filmmakers themselves and their backers. In Britain, meanwhile, the film has been showing via an Internet service that lets anyone pay to license a copy, set up a screening and keep the profit.

The article is about the variety of roll-your-own distribution and marketing campaigns employed by filmmakers who lack studio backing.  But the lede is buried:

Famous fans like Courtney Love were soon chattering online about the film. And an army of “virtual street teamers” — Internet advocates who flood social networks with admiring comments, sometimes for a fee, sometimes not — were recruited by a Web consultant, Sarah Lewitinn, who usually works the music scene.

Here is wikipedia on street teams.  The origin is traced back to the KISS army, a grass-roots fan club that aggressively promoted the band KISS and later “vertically integrated” with the KISS marketing machine where they had access to exclusive promotional merchandise.

Today you can hire a consultant to assemble a street team to promote your band, movie, (hmmm… blog?), … A good consultant will find (or make) fans with a selected personality type, street-cred, and social network and organize them into a guerilla marketing squad armed with swag.

Virtual street teams operate in online social networks.  Presumably then, actual people are no longer required.  A good consultant can manufacture online identities, position them in a social network, getting Twitter followers and Facebook friends and cultivate the marketing opportunities from there.  You can imagine the pitch:  “We can mobilize 10,000 follower-tweets per day…”

Here is the web site of ForTheWin.com, the agency of Sara Lewitinn who coordinated the virtual street team for the film Anvil! The Story of Anvil.

For The Win! is an cooperative of club urchins and nightlife denizens charged with the task of defending the best of pop culture from the daily onslaught of the whack. At night we comb the streets in search of the best fashion, art, music, and movies New York City has to offer. By day we make sure we spread the word to the world by any and all means necessary of the internet to it’s biggest platforms without skipping a step or taking anything for granted. Each of our campaigns is as unique as the artist it represents.

Note they also count Slighly Stoopid, Electrocute, and The Pet Shop Boys (!) as clients.