These are my thoughts and not those of Northwestern University, Northwestern Athletics, the Northwestern football team, nor of the Northwestern football players.
- As usual, the emergence of a unionization movement is the symptom of a problem rather than the cause. Also as usual, a union is likely to only make the problem worse.
- From a strategic point of view the NCAA has made a huge blunder in not making a few pre-emptive moves that would have removed all of the political momentum this movement might eventually have. Few in the general public are ever going to get behind the idea of paying college athletes. Many however will support the idea of giving college athletes long-term health insurance and guaranteeing scholarships to players who can no longer play due to injury. Eventually the NCAA will concede on at least those two dimensions. Waiting to be forced into it by a union or the threat of a union will only lead to a situation which is far worse for the NCAA in the long run.
- The personalities of Kain Colter and Northwestern football add to the interest in the case because as Rodger Sherman points out Northwestern treats its athletes better than just about any other university and Kain Colter is on record saying he loves Northwestern and his coaches. But these developments are bigger than the individuals involved. They stem from economic forces that were going to come to a head sooner or later anyway.
- Before taking sides, take the following line of thought for a spin. If today the NCAA lifted restrictions on player compensation, tomorrow all major athletic programs and their players would mutually, voluntarily enter into agreements where players were paid in some form or another in return for their commitment to the team. We know this because those programs are trying hard to do exactly that every single year. We call those efforts recruiting violations.
- Once that is understood it is clear that to support the NCAA’s position is to support restricting trade that its member schools and student athletes reveal year after year that they want very much. When you hear that universities oppose removing those restrictions you understand that whey they really oppose is removing those restrictions for their opponents. In other words, the NCAA is imposing a collusive arrangement because the NCAA has a claim to a significant portion of the rents from collusion.
- Therefore, in order to take a principled position against these developments you must point to some externality that makes this the exceptional case where collusion is justified.
- For sure, “Everyone will lose interest in college athletics once the players become true professionals” is a valid argument along these lines. Indeed it is easy to write down a model where paying players destroys the sport and yet the only equilibrium is all teams pay their players and the sport is destroyed.
- However, the statement in quotes above is almost surely false. Professional sports are pretty popular. And anyway this kind of argument is usually just a way to avoid thinking seriously about tradeoffs and incremental changes. For example, how many would lose interest in college athletics if tomorrow football players were given a 1% stake in total revenue from the sale of tickets to see them play?
- My summary of all this would be that there are clearly desirable compromises that could be found but the more entrenched the parties get the smaller will be the benefits of those compromises when they eventually, inevitably, happen.
9 comments
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March 26, 2014 at 11:21 pm
Anonymous
Agreed x 9
March 26, 2014 at 11:36 pm
Scott Ogawa (@sogawasan)
Totally agreed, point by point. Also, I just heard another interesting comment: How will all this interact with Title IX requirements?
March 27, 2014 at 8:03 am
Jonas Feit
Numbers two through nine are interesting thoughts, but I’m afraid you’ve mostly foreclosed your authority on the matter with number one. If you really believe that “…as usual, a union is likely to only make the problem worse,” then you’ve sacrificed your economics for your politics. Given that the NCAA is an effective natural monopsony, the efficient outcome is clearly for the players to form a monopoly. To fail to see that is to let an inherent aversion to an equal playing field overwhelm Principles-level micro.
Now, all of this is clearly contingent on the terms of any bargain potentially entered into by the University and the athletes. Paying all players the same wage, for example, would be inefficient. But guaranteed scholarships or freedom to move between Division 1-A schools? The efficiency gains to those outcomes are so blindingly obvious that opposition to them sends a loud signal about one’s prejudices.
It is always illuminating to observe the boundaries of a market fundamentalist’s belief in the market.
March 27, 2014 at 5:46 pm
wellplacedadjective
hi jonas – neat comment.
it is actually not so clear to me why “the efficient outcome” is “for the players to form a monopoly.” can you expand on that? thanks.
March 28, 2014 at 9:28 am
Jonas Feit
In a monopsony, there is only one buyer of, in this case, labor. In a monopsony, the wage is lower than the efficient-outcome wage and the amount of labor employed is lower. (The monopsony in this case is the NCAA, and it is ‘natural’ because the best players seek to play with the other best players, so there is no natural competitor for the services of the best players.) The buyer can maintain this situation because of “buyer’s power,” the additional power a buyer has as the only buyer, similar to “seller’s power,” the additional market power of a monopolist. This outcome is an equilibrium because no action by any participant can improve their lot.
Allowing the sellers of labor, in this case the players, to bargain collectively gives them a measure of seller’s power, which can, depending on the terms over which they are allowed to bargain (see my original comment), offset the buyer’s power of the NCAA. Of course, this is no guarantee of an efficient outcome (market demand = market supply), but it’s likely no make a /more/ efficient outcome, again, depending on terms.
None of this is weird or controversial. As I said above, this is Principles of Economics -level stuff. A lot of people extol the virtues of an “unfettered” market (“..for ever and ever. Amen.”), and gloss over the fact that there is not really any such thing as an unfettered market without inefficiencies. We spend so much time in our courses talking about negative feedback (even if we don’t call it that), where countervailing forces balance out and allow markets to settle into some kind of quadrant I equilibrium. Mostly ignored are positive feedback effects (see George Akerlof’s “Market for Lemons,” for example), where prices and quantities collapse to zero or spiral to infinity, due only to “natural causes.”
The point is that the dreaded tools of interference, like collective bargaining rights, are sometimes necessary to correct these natural inefficiencies. Economists understand this; it’s ideologues who struggle with it.
April 1, 2014 at 3:01 pm
enrique
Building on point #9 … Doesn’t the existence of this dispute between the NCAA and players tend to refute the Coase theorem?
April 1, 2014 at 8:37 pm
enrique
Reblogged this on prior probability.
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