I mean, I wrote back to some of the people – some of them in holy orders or running religious organizations. I said, when you say you’ll pray for me, do you mind if I ask, what for? And a number of them said, quite honestly, not really for your recovery, but that you see the error of your ways.
BLOCK: That you find God.
Mr. HITCHENS: Yeah. Now, I find that not as easy to be graceful about, because though it’s put in a nice way, it’s part of a phenomenon that I’ve always thought of as very disgusting, which is the belief of the religious – which they keep expressing and have done for centuries – that surely now you’re dying, your fears will overcome your reason.
I hope I don’t have to underline what’s horrible about that. There’s an element of blackmail to it. And an element also of tremendous insecurity, I think, on their part. I mean, they don’t seem to feel they’d win the argument so easily with someone who is mentally and physically strong. By the way, I think they’re right.
Chrisopher Hitchens is probably dying from cancer. And if he is, the day will come soon when the people with whom he frames this conflict will never matter again and the only ones left will be Hitchens and God.
When that moment comes why should Christopher Hitchens not try to make it to Heaven? At that moment what does he have to lose? Maybe there is still a little bit of life left to live and doing whatever it takes, praying, reconciling, fretting, may not be the way he wanted to spend it. Or he might feel like a death-bed entreaty only makes a mockery of his life as an outspoken atheist. But now this starts to sound like reason overcome by fear.
Doesn’t reason dictate that unless Hitchens is absolutely convinced there is no God he should, at the very least, say to whoever might be listening “Hey, please let me into Heaven.” ? And doesn’t reason dictate that you cannot be absolutely certain of anything?
But what if God can tell whether you really mean it? He sees through some bogus last-minute self-serving plea. He wants Hitchens to say “Dear God, I believe in you.” And Hitchens, who rationally accepts that God might exist, nevertheless considers it unlikely and therefore cannot honestly say that. At best he could say “Dear God, I p-believe in you, but I admit that p is on the low side.” But shouldn’t he at least say that? After all Hitchens, being a man of reason, cannot be sure exactly what p God demands.
A reasonable Hitchens should understand that God, if he exists, understands Hitchens. “Dear God, conditional on you existing, you deserve all the faith and honesty that you demand of me. However, I am not sure that you exist. In all honesty I think it is unlikely. Here’s the problem. I have used reason to find evidence of your existence but so far I have not found enough to be convinced. If you do exist then evidently I have failed. It could be that I relied too much on reason, but reason told me that there was nothing else to use. I am imperfect, as you of course would know if you exist. In that case I am sorry and I ask your forgiveness.”
As to which God Hitchens is supposed to address this to, that is not a problem. He can make a separate speech to each of the Gods that might be threatening him with damnation in the afterlife. Even if there is an uncountable number of such hypothetical Gods, he can single out the finite number who have Books about them and then say a final catch-all speech addressed at all the others.
There is only one way I can see a reasonable Hitchens deciding against this strategy. He says “Jeff, you are right that since I accept that God might exist and if there is any chance at all that God will allow me into Heaven I should do whatever it takes, within reason, to try and get there. However, among all of the hypothetical Gods that might exist, there is one in particular I am especially nervous about. He’s the God who allows everyone into Heaven except those that ask to go there. And, call me cynical, but reason tells me that in the highly unlikely event that there is a God, out of all the highly unlikely Gods that mankind has imagined, He’s no less likely than the others.”
11 comments
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November 1, 2010 at 5:29 am
Morten
You seem to accept the ridiculousness of your position. I mean, eg how would:
“He can make a separate speech to each of the Gods that might be threatening him with damnation in the afterlife.”
Not be in direct conflict to:
“You shall have no other gods before me”
So I guess that rules out Christianity and Judaism. Right?
November 1, 2010 at 11:17 am
jeff
Since the speech acknowledges the God only conditional on the God’s existence, it does not run afoul of this particular rule. That is, if Jehovah is God, then he is the only God thus voiding the contingency in all of the speeches to all of the non-Jehovahs.
What is potentially more problematic is a God who demands that you acknowledge Him *plus* a handful of other Gods whose existence is incompatible with His. But even this could be dealt with by a slightly more complicated (conditional) speech.
November 1, 2010 at 11:18 am
jeff
Also, I appreciate the compliment in your first sentence. Accepting the ridiculousness of my position is a talent that I cherish.
November 1, 2010 at 12:29 pm
Ryan N
I think that Hitchens would disagree with “Dear God, conditional on you existing, you deserve all the faith and honesty that you demand of me.”
The Christian god and most of the other gods with which I am familiar are all pretty horrible guys. Hitchens would probably claim that anyone guilty of inciting genocide (e.g. Deuteronomy 20:16) deserves nothing from us but contempt.
November 1, 2010 at 10:35 pm
Peter
Too many weak arguments. Read his book and open your mind to the fact that you too just might be wrong and then try again.
November 1, 2010 at 10:57 pm
Sean
Whose book, Hitchens’ or god’s?
November 1, 2010 at 10:54 pm
Sean
To put a finer point on Jeff’s reply to Morten, it is seems likely that some gods would not accept conditional reconciliation. That is, some gods might demand unconditional belief in themselves specifically, and void Hitchens’ contract should he attempt to contract with other possible gods. But Hitchens wasn’t getting into heaven with these gods anyway, so he’s no worse off by trying,unless god matches the description of Jeff’s last paragraph.
But it is that last paragraph which I see Hitchens supporting. If there is a god and he shares our virtues, it must seem cowardly to him that someone lives by one set of beliefs his whole life and then tries to cover his ass at the 11th hour. Much more noble to die the way you lived. So to the extent that god values honesty and integrity, you would presumably lose points by attempting to make these conditional contracts at the end.
Nearly anything can be supported as an equilibrium without common knowledge, but if we shared common knowledge with god we wouldn’t have the existence problem in the first place!
November 2, 2010 at 8:20 am
AS
Should Hitchens also make a conditional penance to the Flying Spaghetti Monster and Xenu and the Cargo Cult as well? Hitchen’s prior is p=0 and the burden of making him change his beliefs lies with the people who make these fantasies up and anyway if you “cannot be absolutely certain of anything” then maybe you cannot be certain if a probability measure can even be applied to meaningfully study this real life problem and any p-belief type analysis is garbage.
November 2, 2010 at 9:40 am
IVV
How does the existence of God affect the optimum life?
Would not the answer of the proper way to live, treat others, pray, congregate, consume, produce, what have you, be true whether or not there is a god?
November 2, 2010 at 3:05 pm
Manuel
Shouldn’t the priors in the game be about belief in afterlife? Because if you do not have a strong prior about the existence of any particular God, there is a strong restriction on the use of your last moments in life deciding between all priors about entering the afterlife which have p<.001, like e.g. "in order to enter a happy afterlife (call it heaven) you have to die while playing the ukelele".
November 2, 2010 at 3:59 pm
Please
If I’m not mistaken, the view expressed in this posting is, in essence, identical to Pascal’s wager. One can argue over silliness like saying that Hitchens would waste no time if he just quickly recanted at the moment of death. Yet as pointed out by others here, the _infinite_ number of (ridiculous) possibilities one conceivably (or inconceivably) would need to address, in order to be complete, defies that notion.
The absurdity of both the original post, and the ensuing discussion, is sufficient evidence, in itself, of the inanity of the argument made by the original post.