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	<title>Comments on: Ron Howard is Not a Game Theorist</title>
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	<link>http://cheaptalk.org/2009/05/13/ron-howard-is-not-a-game-theorist/</link>
	<description>A blog about economics, politics and the random interests of forty-something professors</description>
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		<title>By: michael webster</title>
		<link>http://cheaptalk.org/2009/05/13/ron-howard-is-not-a-game-theorist/#comment-677</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[michael webster]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2009 23:25:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://cheeptalk.wordpress.com/?p=1309#comment-677</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[1.  I agree that the Nash equilibrium never requires anymore than one person, in essence, to reflect on the problem to arrive at a calculation which will also perform the role of a solution or recommendation.

2.  But, I disagree with the view that this is a good video for motivating the attraction of the Nash calculation.  On the contrary, the clear instability of the recommended solution, which is nonetheless attractive, speaks volumes against the Nash calculation.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>1.  I agree that the Nash equilibrium never requires anymore than one person, in essence, to reflect on the problem to arrive at a calculation which will also perform the role of a solution or recommendation.</p>
<p>2.  But, I disagree with the view that this is a good video for motivating the attraction of the Nash calculation.  On the contrary, the clear instability of the recommended solution, which is nonetheless attractive, speaks volumes against the Nash calculation.</p>
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		<title>By: wcs</title>
		<link>http://cheaptalk.org/2009/05/13/ron-howard-is-not-a-game-theorist/#comment-577</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[wcs]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 17 May 2009 15:47:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://cheeptalk.wordpress.com/?p=1309#comment-577</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Interesting, for movie, article and comment.  But non-transferable and relative-state dependent utility is such a strong assumption.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Interesting, for movie, article and comment.  But non-transferable and relative-state dependent utility is such a strong assumption.</p>
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		<title>By: Matt</title>
		<link>http://cheaptalk.org/2009/05/13/ron-howard-is-not-a-game-theorist/#comment-559</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Matt]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2009 14:35:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://cheeptalk.wordpress.com/?p=1309#comment-559</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Crowe Equilibrium: a strategy profile in which every player does strictly better by deviating given the strategies of others.  Brilliant!]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Crowe Equilibrium: a strategy profile in which every player does strictly better by deviating given the strategies of others.  Brilliant!</p>
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		<title>By: Joshua Gans</title>
		<link>http://cheaptalk.org/2009/05/13/ron-howard-is-not-a-game-theorist/#comment-549</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joshua Gans]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2009 05:06:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://cheeptalk.wordpress.com/?p=1309#comment-549</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I think you&#039;ll find that it is the Nash bargaining solution with non-transferable utility. That only requires Pareto efficiency which given that each man would supposedly have negative utility if another were to date the blonde and the preferences of all of the other women, is the outcome in the film.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think you&#8217;ll find that it is the Nash bargaining solution with non-transferable utility. That only requires Pareto efficiency which given that each man would supposedly have negative utility if another were to date the blonde and the preferences of all of the other women, is the outcome in the film.</p>
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